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ABSTRACT 
Silent Interests and All-pay Auctions 
by Kai A. Konrad * 
If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent 
shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction 
framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, 
this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a consequence, 
equilibrium profits of both firms may increase, but the prize may be allocated 
less efficiently. The reverse ownership structure is also likely to increase the 
profits of the firms involved in the ownership relationship but without these 
negative efficiency effects. 
 
Keywords: All-pay auctions, externalities, contests, silent minority shareholdings, 
ownership structure 
JEL Classification: D44, L11, L41  
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Verborgene Interessen und "All-Pay" Auktionen 
Befinden sich Firmen im Wettkampf in "All-Pay" Auktionen unter vollständiger 
Information, so bringen stille Beteiligungen asymmetrische externe Effekte in 
den gesamten Auktionsrahmen. Hält die stärkste Firma einen großen Anteil an 
Aktien der zweitstärksten Firma, kann dies die stärkere Firma von weiteren 
Geboten abhalten. Als Folge vergrößern sich die Profite beider Firmen, sind 
jedoch weniger effizient verteilt. Das umgekehrte Eigentumsverhältnis hebt 
voraussichtlich die Gewinne der beteiligten Firmen an, jedoch ohne negative 
Effizienzauswirkungen. 
                                                 
*  I thank Aron Kiss, Dan Kovenock and Johannes Münster for helpful comments. The usual 
caveat applies. 
 
 
1 Introduction
It is common for a firm to ownminority shares in another competing firm, and
these shareholdings are often small and not suﬃcient to give the firm that
owns them formal control rights.1 As discussed, for instance, in Reynolds
and Snapp (1986), shareholdings of firm A in firm B may soften competition
and increase industry profits, but most of these benefits go to outsiders or
to firm B. In Cournot markets, firms therefore have little or no incentive to
acquire shares in a market competitor (Reitman, 1994). Investing unilaterally
in silent shareholdings can be profitable, depending on the shape of cost
functions and the type of competition, as has been shown by Farrell and
Shapiro (1990), Flath (1991) and Reitman (1994), but when the owners of a
firm A acquire a partial interest without control rights in a firm B, there is a
general tendency for this to benefit the owners of firmB and other firms more
than the owners of firm A. Minority shareholdings, or even cross-ownership
holdings, are also mixed blessings with respect to the sustainability of tacit
collusion (Malueg, 1992).2
Even though competition in auctions is an important part of modern busi-
ness interaction, the role of minority shareholdings is less well understood in
such auction markets. Ettinger (2002, 2003) and Dasgupta and Tsui (2004)
are among the few contributions. However, they consider auctions, not all-
1See, e.g., Gilo (2000) for some empirical evidence.
2Minority shareholdings and the incentives an individual firm has to acquire such hold-
ings must be distinguished from the problem of forming a coalition in terms of mutual
cross-holdings or joint ventures, where both sides share in the benefits of reduced compe-
tition in a symmetric fashion. Mutual cross-holdings are much more likely to be profitable
for all participants for a broad range of market games (see, e.g., Kwoka, 1992).
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pay auctions3 and do not address the issue of whether acquiring shares in an-
other firm is individually rational and profitable in such a context.4 Chillemi
(2004) considers auctions and all-pay auctions with incomplete information
with cross-holdings that fulfill a specific symmetry requirement. Structurally
related problems emerge in auctions with externalities more generally.5
All-pay auctions are the mode of competition between firms when they
compete for market shares by advertizing and other marketing activities (see,
e.g., Schmalensee, 1976), when firms compete for large projects and spend
resources, for instance, in beauty contests, like in architecture, in the compe-
tition for spectrum rights in telecomunications in some countries (see, e.g.,
Börgers and Dustmann, 2003, p. 223 for a country survey) or in markets with
strong network externalities in which firms compete for a de facto natural
monopoly. This type of competition has been discussed in more detail, e.g.,
in Huck, Konrad and Müller (2001) and Konrad (2000).
Here competition between firms will be analysed if the mode of compe-
tition is an all-pay auction with complete information and if one firm has a
silent minority interest in one of the other firms. It turns out that the acqui-
sition of minority shareholdings in a competitor can be in the interest of both
the owners of the buying firm and the majority owners of the firm in which
minority shareholdings are acquired. The firm with the highest valuation of
3An all-pay auction with diﬀerent externalities is considered in Engers and McManus
(2002).
4R&D processes often take a special form of a contest. For an analysis of the role
of complementarity of research inputs in non-cooperative joint ventures and a literature
survey see Anbarci, Lemke and Roy (2002).
5A key contribution to auction theory with externalities is Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stac-
chetti (1996).
2
winning the auction prize may find it profitable to purchase a minority share
in the firm with the second highest valuation of winning, and, given these
shareholdings, may then abstain from bidding in the equilibrium. The results
in this paper provide a partial solution to the more general problem of an
all-pay auction with externalities in a framework with complete information.6
In section 2 the general structure of the problem that is analysed here is
described in more detail. The benchmark equilibrium without shareholdings
as in Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996) is discussed in section 3. Minority
shareholdings and their profitability and welfare properties are analysed in
section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The problem structure
Consider a set N of firms i = 1, ...n which compete for winning a prize in an
all-pay auction with completely informed bidders. The prize can, for instance,
be winning a business contract in a contest, and the firm’s valuation vi de-
notes the operating business surplus which this firm generates from receiving
and fulfilling this business contract. Let firms be sorted and numbered such
that v1 ≥ v2 > ... > vn.7
Each firm i can make a bid xi ≥ 0. It has to pay this bid in full, in-
6For all-pay auctions with externalities only partial results exist. The symmetric case
in which the prize is a public good to some group of competitors that has been considered
in Baik, Kim and Na (2001), is one example.
7Cases with further non-strict inequalities, particularly with v2 = v3, lead to a multi-
plicity of equilibria that is avoided here for simplicity. For a complete description of the
equilibria for other non-strict inequalities in the all-pay auction with complete information
and without externalities see Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996).
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dependent of whether the firm wins the prize or not. The bid in an all-pay
auction is like an up-front eﬀort that is irreversibly lost once it is chosen. In
what follows, the ‘bid’ will sometimes be called ‘the firm’s eﬀort’ in order to
emphasize its non-contingent nature.
The outcome of the all-pay auction is determined as follows. The prize is
awarded to the firm that makes the highest eﬀort. If several firms make the
same highest eﬀort, the prize is awarded to each of these firms with the same
probability. More formally, letM denote the set of firms j for which xj ≥ xk
for all k ∈ N , and let #M be the number of firms in M . The probability
that i wins the contest is a function of all contestants’ eﬀorts, and is denoted
as
pi = pi(x1, x2, ...xn) =
1
#M
if i ∈M and pi = 0 otherwise. (1)
Given the operating surplus vi, bid cost xi and the contest success function
pi, we can define the operating profit of a firm as
πi = pivi − xi. (2)
If firms do not own shares in another firm, this operating profit is what the
firm maximimizes and what is distributed among the shareholders.
Firms may own or aquire shares in other firms. For instance, firm i may
own a minority share θij in firm j. To be ‘silent’, the minority share should
be limited to θij ∈ [0, 1/2).8 One could also consider cross ownership or
the equilibrium ownership structure of shares more generally, but, in what
follows, I restrict attention to θkl ≡ 0 for all firms k 6= i and l 6= j. I ask
how this transaction changes the nature of the all-pay auction equilibrium.
8What makes this question interesting is that a merger or take-over may be subject to
merger control in situations in which obtaining a silent minority share is not.
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If firm i owns a share θij in firm j, this changes the overall profit of this firm
to
Wi = πi + θijπj. (3)
Each firm will generally maximize this overall firm profit Wi, which, for
θij = 0 reduces to Wi = πi.9
A silent share ownership θij will be called mutually profitable if a change
in the ownership structure from θij = 0 to this θij > 0 increases the sum of
operating profits of firms i and j. Mutual profitability is a suﬃcient condition
for a mutually beneficial trade of shares between the owners of firm i and the
owners of firm j. Which silent share ownership is mutually profitable will be
analysed, but the market mechanism that is used to implement this trade is
not considered.10
A second question will be whether the silent share ownership increases or
decreases the expected value that is generated from the equilibrium allocation
of the prize. The value
V =
1
v1
k=nX
k=1
pkvk (4)
9One could also go one step further and consider the private ownership structure of
firms and how the private owners may induce managers not to maximize firm profit but
some other objective function (see, e.g., Bolle and Güth, 1992). In line with the standard
assumptions in the literature on firm crossholdings, however, I will assume firms to maxi-
mize their own overall profit. This is in line with full rationality, for instance, if each firm
is controlled by majority shareholders who do not have cross-holdings in competitors of
this firm.
10Depending on the dispersion of share ownership, such deals may also cause free rider
problems, and the trading mechanism, together with the initial share ownership, will
influence the share price for which the share trading may take place. The focus here is
constrained to the question whether a mutually profitable deal exists.
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will be called measure of social value of the equilibrium allocation of the
prize. The maximum social value is reached if V = 1, i.e., if the firm with
the highest valuation v1 receives the prize with probability 1. Social value
V will generally be a function of θij, as ownership shares may change the
equilibrium win probabilities pi. This social value is also an appropriate
measure of social welfare in cases in which eﬀort is simply a transfer.
3 The equilibrium for θij = 0
If θij = 0, firms compete in an all-pay auction without externalities and each
firm i maximizes πi as in (2). The equilibrium has been fully described by
Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996) for any type of prize structure. The
result applied to the firms context here is stated as
Proposition 1 (Baye, Kovenock and deVries, 1996) Let there be n firms
with valuations v1 ≥ v2 > ... > vn of the prize. Let each firm maximize
(2) by a choice of non-negative eﬀort xi in an all-pay auction with complete
information. The unique auction equilibrium is in mixed strategies as follows.
Firm 1 chooses eﬀort x1 ∈ (0, v2] according to a cumulative distribution
function
F1(x1) = x1/v2, (5)
firm 2 chooses eﬀort x2 ∈ [0, v2] according to
F2(x2) = (1− (v2/v1)) + x2/v1, (6)
and firms k = 3, ...n choose zero eﬀort. The equilibrium expected eﬀorts are
Ex∗1 = v2/2 , Ex
∗
2 =
v2v2
2v1
, and x∗k ≡ 0 for k = 3, ...n, (7)
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and the payoﬀs are
π∗1 = v1 − v2 and π∗k = 0 for all k = 2, ...n. (8)
This result has been used in many applications. It is well known by now,
and a proof will not be repeated here. The equilibrium of the full-information
all pay auction is in mixed strategies. Only the two top firms (the ones who
value winning the auction most highly) participate in the auction and make
positive bids. They randomize their eﬀort uniformly in the interval between
zero and v2, and choose a density that makes the only rival bidder who
actively participates just indiﬀerent with respect to all eﬀort choices in this
interval. The solution is characterized by a mass point at zero eﬀort for the
player with the second highest valuation v2. The solution translates into
expected eﬀort choices and payoﬀs that are fairly simple and depend only on
v2 and on the diﬀerence between v1 and v2. In particular, only the player
who values winning the most gets a positive payoﬀ, and this payoﬀ is equal to
the diﬀerence v1− v2 between this player’s own valuation of winning and the
second highest valuation of winning. The allocation of the prize in the all-
pay auction with complete information is ineﬃcient, at least in expectation,
unless v1 = v2. The social value is V = 1 − v22v1
v1−v2
v1
. A key property of
this equilibrium for explaining the results in what follows is that an increase
in v1 does not change firm 1’s equilibrium strategies, but changes player 2’s
bidding behavior and increases the probability that player 2 bids zero.11
11Goeree, Anderson and Holt (1998) discuss the comparative static properties of all-pay
auctions with complete information. These properties motivate them to consider ’noisy’
players, as in Goeree, Anderson and Holt (1998) and in Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998).
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4 Minority ownership
Consider now a minority shareholding θij > 0 of firm i in firm j for one
firm i and one firm j. The ownership share of firm i in firm j changes the
valuation firm i attributes to the prize compared to the operating surplus, and
the resulting valuation depends on the bidding behavior of other firms. Let
Fk(x) be the cumulative distribution function of bids by firm k. To illustrate,
adopt for a moment the tie-breaking rule that i wins if xi = max{...xk, ...},
and let j have no mass point at xi. Then (3) for a given xi can be rewritten
for some given bid level xi as
Wi(xi) =
Y
k/∈{i,j}
Fk(xi)Fj(xi)vi− xi + θijvj
∞Z
xi
Y
k/∈{i,j}
Fk(xj)dFj(xj)− θijE(xj),
(9)
where the first two terms are i’s operating profit and the second two terms
are i’s profit from silent share-ownership. An increase in xi has a direct
eﬀect via i’s operating profit and an indirect eﬀect on i’s overall profit of
∂Wi
∂πj
∂πj
∂xi
= −θijvj
Y
k/∈{i,j}
Fk(xi)dFj(xi).
A first result is
Proposition 2 If θij > 0 with i < j and j ≥ 3 or if θij > 0 in firm j < i
for i ≥ 3, the bidding strategies as in Proposition 1 constitute an equilibrium.
Such shareholdings do not change operating profits or overall profits of firms
in the equilibrium.
Proof. Note that Wk = πk = pkvk − xk for all k 6= i, and Wi = pivi − xi
+θij[pjvj − xj]. Suppose all firms anticipate that all other firms choose the
candidate equilibrium bid strategies as in Proposition 1. All firms k 6= i
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maximize πk = pkvk − xk. Then the candidate equilibrium strategies in
Proposition 1 are the optimal replies for all k 6= i. Moreover, (5) and (6),
together with Fk(0) = 1 for all k ∈ {3, 4, ...n}\{i}, implies that pk = 0 for
k ≥ 3. Therefore, Wi also reduces to Wi = pivi − xi = πi, making Fi as in
Proposition 1 an optimal reply.
Intuitively, if firms own shares in inactive firms, or if inactive firms own
shares in other firms, this does not change the incentives of active firms.
Interesting implications of a firm’s ownership shares in another firm can be
expected only for ownership shares θ12 and θ21. The case θ12 > 0 is considered
first.
Proposition 3 (i) if v1 − θ12v2 ∈ (v2, v1] then an equilibrium exists with
πk =Wk = 0 for all k ≥ 2 and
W1 = v1 − v2 − θ12
(v2)
2
2(v1 − θ12v2)
.
Share ownership in this interval is not mutually profitable. (ii) if v1−θ12v2 ∈
(v3, v2), then an equilibrium exists with πk =Wk = 0 for all k ≥ 3,
W2 = π2 = (1 + θ12)v2 − v1
and
π1 = 0 and W1 = θ12(v2 −
v1 − θ12v2
2
).
Share ownership in this interval is mutually profitable iﬀ θ12v2 > 2(v1 − v2).
A proof is in the Appendix. Intuitively, if θ12 is small as in (i) then the
nature of the equilibrium is not changed, compared to θ12 = 0. Only firms 1
and 2 compete against each other. Firm 1’s valuation of winning equals the
diﬀerence between its own operating surplus v1 and θ12v2 (what it gets from
9
losing), compared to θ12 = 0. Firm 2 has the same prize of winning, but
the prize for firm 1 is reduced. The diﬀerence between valuations of winning
still determines the prize for the firm with the higher valuation, the firm
with the second highest valuation competes actively but makes zero profit,
and all other firms prefer to be inactive. If θ12 is suﬃciently large to make
v3 < v1−θ12v2 < v2 as in (ii), when firms 1 and 2 compete, firm 2 still values
the prize of winning at v2. However, playing against firm 2, firm 1 gains only
v1 − θ12v2 if the prize is awarded to 1 and not to 2, and this net prize of
winning is so small that firm 2 values winning the prize more highly than
firm 1. The firms switch ranks as regards prize valuations. As known from
Proposition 1, the rank and the diﬀerences in valuations determine payoﬀs.
Firm 2 receives a positive operating profit and firm 1 receives an operating
profit of zero, and a positive overall profit, due to its shareholdings in firm 2.
Proposition 4 If v1 − θ12v2 ∈ ((1 − θ122 )v3,
1
2
) then an equilibrium exists
in which only firms 2 and 3 are active, and with πk = Wk = 0 for all
k = 2, 4, 5, ...n, π1 = 0, W2 = π2 = v2− v3 and W1 = θ12(v2− v3). Moreover,
an ownership share of this size is mutually profitable if and only if v1− v2 <
v2 − v3.
A proof is in the Appendix. The most interesting result in Proposition 4
is the possibility that firm 1, which has the highest operating surplus from
winning the auction, becomes passive and still makes higher profits than in
the equilibrium with θ12 = 0. Intuitively, without minority shareholdings,
firm 1 and firm 2 may compete tightly and dissipate most, or all, of the op-
erating surplus that can be obtained from winning the prize in the auction.
If, instead, firm 1 successfully commits to not making bids, the diﬀerence
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between firm 2’s and firm 3’s valuations of winning describes the total rent
that is allocated among firms, and, if this diﬀerence is larger than the diﬀer-
ence in the valuations v1 and v2 of the prize for firms 1 and 2, total industry
profit goes up for this θ12, compared to θ12 = 0. Even firm 1, and its owners,
can benefit from this, as all this rent accrues in firm 2 and firm 1 receives
a share in these profits that equals its ownership share in firm 2. The only
problem is to make firm 1 credibly commit to bidding zero.
As discussed in Proposition 4, this will work only if firm 1’s ownership
share in firm 2 is suﬃciently large, if the diﬀerence in the valuations of the
prize for firms 1 and 2 is small, and if the diﬀerence in prizes between v2 and
v3 is larger than the diﬀerence between v1 and v2, but also not too large.
To see that the parameter range with θ12 < 1/2 for which v1 − θ12v2 >
(1− θ12
2
)v3 holds is non-empty, note that this condition reduces to v3 > 23v2
for (v1 − v2)→ 0 and θ12 = 1/2.
The result is based on a mechanism that is explored in a paper by Baye,
Kovenock and deVries (1993). They consider the problem of an auction
designer to be whether to exclude the bidder who -in terms of this paper-
has the highest operating surplus from winning the prize. The designer is
interested in high total eﬀort which is increasing in the valuation of win-
ning of the bidder who has the second highest valuation, and decreasing in
the diﬀerence between the highest and the second highest valuation of win-
ning. In the absence of firms’ ownership shares in other firms, excluding the
bidder with the highest operating profit is worthwhile from the designer’s
perspective if it improves on competitive balance, and hence, total expected
eﬀort. In Proposition 4, the contestant with the highest operating surplus
may choose an ownership structure that commits himself to not being active
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in the contest, if this suﬃciently increases competitive imbalance. Unlike the
contest designer who likes much eﬀort, and hence, likes to increase competi-
tive balance, the competitors themselves are interested in generating a high
competitive imbalance, as a larger diﬀerence between them reduces contest
eﬀort.
Consider now the intermediate range of θ12 that is not covered by Propo-
sitions 3 and 4.
Proposition 5 If v1−θ12v2 ∈ ((1− θ122 )v3, v3) no equilibrium exists in which
only two firms are active. For any equilibrium, a suﬃcient condition for θ12
in this range to be mutually profitable is v1 − v2 < v2 − v3.
A proof is in the Appendix. Intuitively, if firm 1 loses, it still cares about
whether firm 2 or some other firm (e.g., firm 3) wins the prize. Competing
against firm 2, firm 1 is not very agressive as some of the gains of firm 2
make firm 1 also gain, due to the shareholdings. However, competing against
firm 3, firm 1’s stake is larger and equal to the full valuation v1 of the prize.
The fact that firm 1 is not indiﬀerent to whom it competes with generates an
additional discontinuity in the problem and makes it diﬃcult to address the
question of existence, or to characterize an equilibrium. An intuition for why
the minority share is mutually profitable in an equilibrium if v1−v2 < v2−v3
is based on the insight that bids higher than x = v3 will not occur in the
equilibrium, which yields some lower limit for firm 2’s operating profits.
So far only profitability aspects have been considered.
Proposition 6 Consider θ12 > 0: In the equilibria that are characterized in
Proposition 3 and 4, the social value V (θ12) < V (0).
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Proof. The result follows from p1(θ12 = 0) > p(θ12 > 0) for all θ12 > 0 and
p1(θ12 = 0) + p2(θ12 = 0) = 1 ≥ p1(θ12 > 0) + p2(θ12 > 0) for all θ12 > 0.
If firm 1 owns a stake in firm 2, this makes firm 1 a less aggressive bidder,
up to the point where firm 1 becomes even fully inactive. Generally, this
makes it less likely that firm 1 which has the highest v1 wins, and, once only
firms 2 and 3 are active, it becomes possible that firm 3, that values the prize
by even less than firm 2 does, will win the prize.
The case θ21 > 0 is considered next.
Proposition 7 For θ21 ∈ [0,min{v2−v3v1 , 12}) an equilibrium exists with the
following properties: only firms 1 and 2 make positive bids. W1 = π1 =
v1− (v2− θ21v1), W2 = θ12π1, π2 = 0, Wk = πk = 0 for all k > 2. Moreover,
social value V is increasing in θ21 on this interval.
A proof is in the Appendix. If firm 2 owns some shares in firm 1, and if
the ownership share is small enough, firms 1 and 2 will remain to be the only
firms that are active in the equilibrium. Hence, all other firms’ operating
profits are zero. Moreover, as long as firm 1 and firm 2 are the only active
firms, firm 2’s ownership share in firm 1 reduces the overall value which firm
2 attributes to winning, as firm 2 receives θ21v1 even if firm 2 loses, and v2
if it wins. The overall value that firm 1 attributes to winning is unchanged.
Accordingly, as regards the bidding incentives, the share ownership in firm
1 is very similar to a reduction in firm 2’s valuation of winning. It increases
the diﬀerence in the two firms’ overall valuations of winning and increases
firm 1’s profits. However, as firm 2 now owns a share in firm 1’s profits,
firm 2 receives a share in firm 1’s operating profit. Also, the increase in the
diﬀerence in overall valuation of winning makes it more likely that firm 1
wins the prize, and this increases V .
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For small ownership shares, this reasoning applies monotonically for any
further increase in the ownership share. However, as the diﬀerence in valu-
ations increases, the overall valuation of winning for firm 2 becomes smaller
and smaller. Once it drops below v3, the nature of the equilibrium changes.
Firm 3 becomes an active player. At least, the equilibrium that underlies
Proposition 7 and is characterized in the proof of the proposition no longer
continues to exist. Given the candidate equilibrium strategies (19) and (20),
firm 3 would not remain inactive, but would bid higher than v2 − θ21v1.
There is again an intermediate range in which the equilibrium cannot
be one in which only two players are active, and it is diﬃcult to obtain a
closed form solution for an equilibrium in this range. However, the mutual
profitability of shareholdings θ21 can again be limited from below:
Proposition 8 The sum of operating profits of firms 1 and 2 in an equilib-
rium with v2 − θ21v1 < v3 is at least equal to v1 − v3.
Again, the proof is in the Appendix. The equilibrium can be fully char-
acterized as soon as θ21 becomes suﬃciently large and also yields an intuition
for the profitability result in Proposition 8:
Proposition 9 If
(v1 −
v3
2
)θ21 > v2 − v3 and v2 > θ21
v1
2
. (10)
then an equilibrium exists in which only firms 1 and 3 are active. The sum
of overall profits for firms 1 and 2 are v1 − v3, and V (θ21) is smaller than
V (0) iﬀ v3(v1 − v3) < v2(v1 − v2).
As shown in the proof in the Appendix, firm 2 may become inactive
in the bidding process if it owns a suﬃciently large share in firm 1. Such
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shareholdings reduce the overall value that firm 2 attributes to winning vis-
a-vis firm 1, and may reduce this value suﬃciently to make firm 3 an active
bidder. As a consequence, only firms 1 and 3 compete actively, and firm 2
enjoys some passive income from share ownership. This is profitable from
the joint perspective of firms 1 and 2 as it increases firm 1’s operating profit
to v1− v3, and keeps firm 2’s operating profit at zero. However, when firm 2
becomes inactive, firm 3 becomes active. This has a negative impact for firm
2: with all firms except firm 1 and firm 2 inactive, if firm 2 does not win, firm
1 wins and firm 2 receives some shareholdership returns. Once firm 3 is active,
firm 3 may also win, in which case firm 2 does not receive shareholdership
returns. The condition (10) makes sure that the shareholdership returns from
ownership in firm 1 are suﬃciently large in the equilibrium in which only firm
1 and firm 3 are active so as to make it not attractive for firm 2 to make a
positive bid.
5 Conclusions
Minority shareholdings can, but need not, increase firms’ and industry profit
in markets of the all-pay auction type. Particularly if the silent shareholdings
a firm purchases in another firm increase the diﬀerence in valuation of winning
for the firms who have the highest operating surpluses from winning the
competition, the acquisition of such shareholdings is likely to benefit the
owners of both firms that are involved in this acquisition. For a profit increase
to emerge from silent ownership, the firm that has the highest operating
surplus from winning the auction (the ‘strongest’ firm) may purchase shares
in the firm that has the second highest operating surplus from winning or
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vice versa. The first type of share purchase typically decreases the eﬃciency
of the prize allocation in the auction, the second type of share purchase
can increase eﬃciency. This result is of interest for competition authorities
when evaluating silent shareholdings. Generally, silent share ownership is
not neutral with respect to firm profits and eﬃciency, and firm profits and
eﬃciency need not be aligned. Competition authorities may treat profitable
share ownership diﬀerently, depending whether a stronger firm that has a
higher operating surplus from winning the competition purchases shares in
a weaker firm, or whether a weaker firm, i.e., a firm that has a smaller
operating surplus from winning the competiton purchases shares in a stronger
competitor.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) For v1 − θ12v2 ∈ (v2, v1) consider the cumu-
lative distribution functions Fk(0) = 1 for all k = 3, ...n,
F1(x) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
x
v2
for x ∈ (0, v2]
1 for x > v2
(11)
and
F2 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(1− v2
v1−θ12v2 ) +
x
v1−θ12v2 for x ∈ [0, v2]
1 for x > v2
(12)
as candidate equilibrium strategies. Note that πk(xk) = F1(xk)F2(xk)vk −
xk < 0 for all xk > 0. Hence, Fk(0) = 1 is an optimal reply for k = 3, ...n.
Next, using W2 = π2 and inserting (11) in (2), π2(x2) = x2v2 v2 − x2 = 0 for
all x2 ∈ [0, v2] and equal to v2 − x2 < 0 for x2 > v2. Accordingly, any mixed
strategy F2 on the support [0, v2] is optimal for firm 2, in particular F2 as
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in (12). Finally, inserting the candidate equilibrium cumulative distribution
functions for k = 2, ...n, W1(x1) becomes equal to v1 − v2 − θ12 (v2)
2
2(v1−θ12v2)
for x1 ∈ (0, v2], and equal to v1 − x1 − θ12 (v2)
2
2(v1−θ12v2) for x1 > v2, and hence,
strictly smaller for x1 > v2 than for x1 ∈ (0, v2]. This makes any bid x1 ∈
(0, v2) optimal and makes the candidate equilibrium strategy F1(x) as in (11)
an optimal reply.
As regards mutual profitability, the sum of profits is π1 + π2 = (v1 −
θ12v2)− v2 < v1 − v2.
(ii) For v1−θ12v2 ∈ (v3, v2), consider the following cumulative distribution
functions as candidate equilibrium strategies: Fk(0) = 1 for all k = 3, ...n,
F1(x) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1− v1−θ12v2
v2
+ x
v2
for x ∈ [0, v1 − θ12v2)
1 for x > v1 − θ12v2
(13)
and
F2(x) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
x
v1−θ12v2 for x ∈ [0, v1 − θ12v2)
1 for x > v1 − θ12v2.
(14)
Consider whether these are optimal replies to each other. Note that Wk =
πk(xk) = F1(xk)F2(xk)vk − xk < 0 for all xk > 0. Hence, xk = 0 is an
optimal reply for k = 3, ...n. Next, W2(x2) = π2(x2) = (1 − v1−θ12v2v2 +
x
v2
)v2 − x = v2 − [v1 − θ12v2] for all x2 ∈ [0, v1 − θ12v2] and smaller for any
x2 > v1−θ12v2. Accordingly, any randomization F2 on [0, v1−θ12v2] is optimal
for firm 2, and this makes F2 as in (14) an optimal reply. Finally, inserting
the candidate equilibrium cumulative distribution functions for k = 2, ...n,
W1(x1) = θ12(v2 − v1+θ12v22 ) for x1 ∈ [0, v2], and smaller for x1 > v2. This
makes any randomization of x1 on (0, v2) optimal and makes F1 as in (13)
an optimal reply.
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As regards the sum of operating profits, W1(θ12) + (1 − θ12)W2(θ12) =
π1 + π2 = (v1 − θ12v2)− v2 > v1 − v2 iﬀ 2(v1 − v2) < θ12v2. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4. Firms k = 2, ...n maximize Wk = πk =
pkvk − xk. Suppose firm 1 abstains from bidding. Then the results from
Proposition 1 apply to the set of firms {2, 3, ...n} with firms 2 and 3 replacing
firms 1 and 2. The unique equilibrium is then characterized by the mixed
strategies x2 ∈ (0, v3] distributed according to
F2(x) =
x
v3
(15)
and x3 ∈ [0, v3] distributed according to
F3(x) = (1−
v3
v2
) +
x
v2
(16)
and xi ≡ 0 for all i = 4, ...n. For firm 1 the choice x1 ≡ 0 is indeed optimal
given (15) and (16). Firm 1’s payoﬀ from bidding x1 ≥ 0 is
π1(x1) = F2(x1)F3(x1)v1 − x1 + θ12
∙
v2
Z ∞
x1
F3(x2)dF2(x2)− E(x2)
¸
, (17)
where E(x2) denotes the expected eﬀort of firm 2. The last term is firm 1’s
share in firm 2’s expected profit as a function of x1, given that firms k > 3
choose xk = 0. Substituting (15) and (16) into (17) yields
x1v2 − x1v3 + (x1)2
v3v2
v1 − x1 + θ12
∙
v2 − v3 −
v2 − v3
v3
x1 −
(x1)
2
2v3
¸
. (18)
The term (18) is quadratic in x1 and the quadratic term enters positively if
v1
v2v3
> θ12
1
2v3
, which is always fulfilled, as θ12 < 1/2 and v1 ≥ v2. Hence, this
function is strictly convex in x1 and has its global maximum on the interval
[0, v3] either at x1 = 0 or at x1 = v3. From inserting x1 = 0 and x1 = v3 in
(17) one gets π1(0) = θ12(v2−v3), and π1(v3) = v1−v3−θ12v3/2. Accordingly,
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x1 = 0 is optimal given (15) and (16) if θ12(v2− v3) > v1− v3− θ12v3/2, and
this is equivalent to v1 − θ12v2 < (1 − θ122 )v3. This shows that F1(0) = 1 is
indeed an optimal reply.
As regards the sum of the operating profits, π1(0) + π2(0) = v1− v2, and
π1(θ12) + π2(θ12) = v2 − v3 for θ12 with (v1 − θ12v2) ∈ ((1− θ122 )v3,
1
2
). ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. Returning to the proof of Proposition 4, for
F1(0) = 1 = Fk(0) for k = 4, ...n, if firm 1 does not make positive bids, the
unique equilibrium cumulative distribution functions F2 and F3 are given
by (15) and (16). However, x1 = v3 becomes superior to x1 = 0 given
these strategies if v1 − θ12v2 ∈ ((1− θ122 )v3, v3). This shows that there is no
equilibrium in which only firms 2 and 3 make positive bids.
Consider next xk ≡ 0 for all k = 3, ...n. A bid xˆ1 ∈ (v3 − , v3) turns out
to be strictly dominated by x1 =  for suﬃciently small , whatever firm 2’s
strategy is. A choice x1 =  makes either firm 1 or firm 2 win. Hence, the
payoﬀ for firm 1 is
W1() ≥ θ12v2 − − θ12E(x2).
If firm 1 choses xˆ1 ∈ (v3 − , v3) then
W1(xˆ1) ≤ v1 − (v3 − )− θ12E(x2).
Accordingly, W1() > W1(xˆ1) if θ12v2 − v1 + v3 > 0 for suﬃciently small .
Moreover, x1 < v3 −  also implies that x2 < v3 − 2 . Accordingly, firm 3
could make a positive payoﬀ, for instance, by choosing x3 = v3 − 4 , and,
hence, F3(0) = 1 is not optimal. This shows that there is no equilibrium in
which only firms 1 and 2 are active.
Finally, an equilibrium in which only firms 1 and 3 are active is not
feasible. W2 = 0 in such an equilibrium. Moreover, neither firm 1 nor firm
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3 would make bids higher than v3. Hence, firm 2 could make positive profit
by making a bit in the interval x2 ∈ (v3, v2). Hence, a contradiction.
Note that firm 3 (or even firms k > 3) would never make bids higher
than the operating surplus it could obtain from winning: xk ≤ v3 for k ≥ 3.
Accordingly, the prize goes to firm 1 or firm 2 with probability 1 if at least one
of them makes a bid equal to v3+  for small positive . Further, if Fk(x) = 1
for all x > v3 and k ≥ 3, then firm 1 will never bid more than v3 + (/2).
Accordingly, for firm 2, W2 = π2 ≥ v2 − (v3 + ). Further, firm 1 maximizes
W1 = p1v1−x1+ θ12π2 = π1+ θ12π2. This has a lower bound equal to θ12π2,
for instance for a choice x1 = 0. This implies that π1 = W1 − θ12π2 ≥ 0. In
turn, π1 + π2 > π2 ≥ v2 − v3 − . ¤
Proof of Proposition 7. The strategies
F1(x1) =
x1
v2 − θ21v1
with x1 ∈ [0, v2 − θ21v1], (19)
F2(x2) = (1−
v2 − θ21v1
v1
) +
x2
v1
with x2 ∈ [0, v2 − θ21v1] (20)
and xk ≡ 0 for all k = 3, ...n constitute an equilibrium for the following
reasons. Firm 1 values winning by v1 and attributes a value of zero to
the event of any other firm winning the prize. For (20) and xk ≡ 0 for
all k = 3, ...n firm 1’s payoﬀ is equal to v1 − (v2 − θ21v1) for any x1 ∈
(0, v2− θ21v1], and smaller than this payoﬀ for all other choices of x1. Hence,
(19) is an optimal reply for firm 1. It is assumed in Proposition 7 that
θ21 <
v2−v3
v1
. Hence, firms k = 3, ...n value winning the prize by less than
v2− θ21v1. Given (19), these firms strictly maximize their payoﬀ by a choice
of eﬀort xk ≡ 0. It remains to show that (20) is an optimal reply for firm 2.
Given (19) for firm 1 and xk ≡ 0 for k = 3, ..., firm 2’s payoﬀ is W2(x2) =
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F1(x2)v2 + (1− F1(x2))θ21v1 − x2 − θ21E(x1), and can be rewritten as
W2(x2) = F1(x2)(v2 − θ21v1)− x2 + θ21(v1 −E(x1)). (21)
The third term on the right-hand side in (21) is a constant with respect to x2,
and is strictly positive, and it does not matter for firm 2’s optimization choice.
Hence, firm 2 behaves like a firm with a valuation of the prize that equals
(v2−θ21v1). Given (19), this makes all x2 ∈ [0, v2−θ21v1] yield the same payoﬀ
for firm 2, and this payoﬀ is larger than for any other x2 /∈ [0, v2 − θ21v1].
Any mixed strategy on the support [0, v2 − θ21v1] is then an optimal reply.
The equilibrium that is described by (19) and (20) and xk = 0 for all other
firms k = 3, ...n has the properties outlined in the proposition. Aggregate
payoﬀ of firms is v1 − (v2 − θ21v1), and this is strictly increasing in θ21.
Moreover, V increases in θ21 as
∂p1
∂θ21
= − ∂p1
∂θ21
> 0. ¤
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider v2 − θ21v1 ∈ (v3 − θ21 v32 , v3). Firms
k ≥ 3 will not bid higher than xk = v3. For this reason, any bid xˆ2 > v3 by
firm 2 is dominated by a bid in the range x2 ∈ (v3, xˆ2). Accordingly, firm 2
will not make a bid higher than v3 + . In turn, this implies that firm 1 will
not bid higher than v3+2. Accordingly, firm 1’s operating profit is bounded
from below by v1 − v3 − . Moreover, as W2 = π2 + θ21π1, this overall profit
is bounded from below by θ21π1, as this overall profit can be attained by
x2 = 0. Hence, π2 is bounded from below by 0. Accordingly, the sum of
operating profits must be bounded from below by v1 − v3 − . Now consider
→ 0. ¤
Proof of Proposition 9. Suppose that firm 2 does not make positive
bids: x2 ≡ 0. Then the equilibrium among the remaining firms is character-
ized in analogy to Proposition 1 as in Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996),
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with firm 3 assuming the role of firm 2. The unique mixed strategies are
characterized by
F1(x) =
x
v3
for x ∈ [0, v3] (22)
and
F3(x) = 1−
v3
v1
+
x
v1
for x ∈ [0, v3]. (23)
For (22) and (23) x2 ≡ 0 is indeed optimal for firm 2 if conditions (10) hold.
Firm 2’s overall payoﬀ from bidding x2 ≥ 0 is
W2(x2) = F1(x2)F3(x2)v2 − x2 + θ21
∙
v1
Z ∞
x2
F3(x1)dF1(x1)−
v3
2
¸
. (24)
Substitution of (22) and (23) into (24) yields
W2(x2) =
x2
v3
v1 − v3 + x2
v1
v2 − x2 + θ21
∙
v1 − v3 − (
v1 − v3
v3
x2 +
1
2
x2x2
v3
)
¸
.
(25)
This expression is a quadratic function in x2. The quadratic term enters
with a positive sign, as v2
v3v1
> θ21
1
2v3
by the second condition in (10). The
function is, therefore, strictly convex and has its global maximum on the
interval [0, v3] either at 0 or at v3. From inserting x2 = 0 and x2 = v3
in (24) one gets π1(0) = θ21(v1 − v3), and π1(v3) = v2 − v3 − θ21 v32 . The
choice x2 = 0 is optimal if θ21(v1 − v3) − v2 + v3 + θ21 v32 > 0, which can
also be written equivalently as the first condition in (10). The firms’ profits
(including earnings from ownership shares) in this equilibrium become equal
to π1 + π2 = v1 − v3 and πk = 0 for all k ≥ 3. Industry profit is increased,
now from v1 − v2 to v1 − v3.
Social value is higher in the range of θ21 for which firm 2 becomes inactive
than for θ21 = 0 if V (θ21) = 1− v32v1
v1−v3
v1
> 1− v2
2v1
v1−v2
v1
= V (0). This is true
if v3(v1 − v3) < v2(v1 − v2) ¤
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